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Abstract
This paper analyzes how biased beliefs about employment prospects a¤ect the optimal design
of unemployment insurance. Empirically, I nd that the unemployed greatly overestimate how
quickly they will nd work. As a consequence, they would search too little for work, save
too little for unemployment and deplete their savings too rapidly when unemployed. I analyze
the use of su¢ cient-statisticsformula to characterize the optimal unemployment policy when
beliefs are biased and revisit the desirability of providing liquidity to the unemployed. I also nd
that the optimal unemployment policy may involve increasing benets during the unemployment
spell.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers and insurers face the trade-o¤ between providing insurance against risks and provid-
ing incentives to avoid these risks. This trade-o¤ is central in the design of unemployment policies
(Baily 1978, Chetty 2006). Unemployment insurance aims to protect workers against the loss of
their earnings when unemployed, but also to preserve their incentives to leave unemployment again.
The workersperceptions regarding their employment prospects should play a crucial role for this
trade-o¤. They determine how much workers are willing to protect themselves against unemploy-
ment and how much e¤ort displaced workers are willing to invest to nd new employment. However,
comparing the reported expectations of unemployed job seekers to the actual outcomes of their job
search reveals a striking optimistic bias. Based on a survey by Price et al. (1998), I nd that on
average unemployed job seekers expect to remain unemployed for an additional 6:8 weeks.1 Only
one out of ten job seekers expect that he or she will need more than three additional months to
nd employment. In follow-up interviews, subjects are asked when they actually started working.
Accounting for censored unemployment spells, the average remaining duration for the same sample
of job seekers exceeded 23:0 weeks. This is more than three times longer than expected. One out
of two job seekers needed more than three additional months to nd employment. This remarkable
optimistic bias is also illustrated in Figure 1 showing the distribution of the di¤erence between the
actual and expected remaining duration of unemployment for the di¤erent job seekers: more than
80% of the job seekers have underestimated rather than overestimated the length of their unem-
ployment spell and their forecast errors are much more pronounced. This evidence complements a
large empirical literature in psychology and economics documenting systematic biases in risk per-
ceptions and motivates analyzing the role of biased beliefs for the optimal design of unemployment
insurance. The analysis in this paper shows that the presence of biased beliefs a¤ects the conclu-
sions regarding two prominent topics in the recent literature: the rst regards the identication of
"su¢ cient statistics" capturing the optimal trade-o¤ between insurance and incentives, the second
regards the optimal timing of unemployment benets and the optimal provision of liquidity.
I rst consider a stylized model of unemployment (Baily 1978, Chetty 2006) in which an em-
ployed agent decides how much to save for unemployment and how much to search when unem-
ployed. In contrast with previous work, I allow the agent to have biased beliefs about her em-
ployment prospects and to maximize her perceived expected utility. A paternalistic social planner,
however, designs the unemployment policy to maximize the agents true expected utility. When
determining the optimal generosity of the unemployment policy, the social planner trades o¤ the
value of additional insurance and the cost of reduced incentives. This trade-o¤ depends critically
on how beliefs are biased in two particular dimensions. The baseline beliefs - the beliefs about the
baseline job nding probability for given search e¤orts - a¤ect the perceived value of insurance and
1The results are based on a sample of 1,487 job seekers in Michigan and Maryland surveyed repeatedly between
1996 and 1998 by Price et al. (1998). Subjects were asked about their baseline expectations in the question: "How
many weeks do you estimate it will actually be before you will be working more than 20 hours as week." I provide
more details about the survey, the empirical results and the robustness of the optimistic bias in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Histogram of di¤erences between actual and expected unemployment durations. Calculations are
based on a survey by Price et al. (1998).
thus the agents willingness to save for unemployment. The control beliefs - the beliefs about the in-
crease in the job nding probability when searching more intensively - a¤ect the agents willingness
to exert search e¤ort in order to leave unemployment.
I characterize the impact of these biases on the optimal unemployment policy by building on a
canonical result known as the Baily formula. In its standard formulation, this formula states that
at the optimum the consumption smoothing benet from an increase in unemployment benets
should be equal to the incentive (or moral hazard) cost. The consumption smoothing benet
depends on the wedge between employment and unemployment consumption, while the incentive
cost is captured by the elasticity of the unemployment probability. Several recent studies have
analyzed the implementation of the Baily formula as it identies two simple su¢ cient statistics for
unemployment policy that can be estimated using reduced-form methods (see Gruber 1997, Chetty
2006, 2008, 2009, Shimer and Werning 2007, Landais 2013). A key insight of the su¢ cient-statistics
analysis is that the agents behavioral responses to policy only matter to the extent that they a¤ect
the policy makers budget. This is no longer true when an agents behavior is distorted due to
biased beliefs. Biased beliefs do not only change the consumption wedge and the elasticity of the
unemployment probability that we would estimate empirically, but also make that corrections of
these respective statistics are required to characterize the optimal policy. While the moral hazard
cost needs to be corrected for the distortion in search e¤orts, the consumption smoothing benet
needs to be corrected for the distortion in precautionary savings. The analysis reveals the potential
value of active labor market policies a¤ecting search e¤orts directly and the potential cost of policies
relying on the individualsown savings to protect themselves against unemployment (e.g., Altman
and Feldstein 2006).
I then consider a standard dynamic model of the unemployment spell (Shavell and Weiss 1979,
Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997) to analyze the dynamics of the unemployment policy. I explicitly
allow for unobservable savings and focus on CARA preferences like in Werning (2002) and Shimer
and Werning (2008). I rst use the model to show that the Baily decomposition into consumption
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smoothing benets and incentive costs again leads to an intuitive characterization of the optimal
static unemployment policy and the corrections required for biased beliefs in this dynamic model.
I then use the model to analyze the optimal timing of benets and the desirability of allowing
borrowing and savings. In particular, I revisit the powerful result in Shimer and Werning (2008)
that the optimal unemployment policy can be implemented with a simple policy that keeps un-
employment benets and taxes constant and gives the unemployed access to savings. This result
assumes unbiased beliefs. A baseline-optimistic agent, however, underestimates how long she will
remain unemployed and will deplete her assets too rapidly given the expected duration of her un-
employment spell. In theory, this increases the value of controlling the unemployeds savings and
puts into question the (uncontrolled) provision of liquidity to the unemployed. A calibration of
the dynamic model suggests that access to savings substantially increases the value of the static
unemployment policy. This increase hardly depends on whether the access to savings is controlled
or not provided that the static policy is optimally adjusted. Finally, by underestimating the prob-
ability to be long-term unemployed a baseline-optimistic job seeker is also less responsive to future
incentives. As a consequence, the social planner can provide more insurance to the long-term un-
employed at a low incentive cost for the short-term unemployed. I show how this can result in
increasing unemployment benets during the unemployment spell.
Related Literature A vast literature in psychology starting with the seminal work by Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) and a growing literature in economics nd that risk perceptions are subject to
systematic biases. By now there is broad evidence that people tend to overestimate the probability
of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative events.2 This has also lead to a
theoretical literature proposing explanations for the biases in beliefs and nding that optimistic
beliefs are more likely to arise and persist.3 In the context of unemployment, some previous work
has analyzed perceptions about employment prospects, but without linking the perceptions and
outcomes of the same individuals (see Manski 2004). A recent poll by Gallup in the US nds that 4
in 10 unemployed job seekers expect to nd employment within a month. The average job nding
rate in the US is, however, much lower, which is again suggestive of a substantial optimistic bias.4
In ongoing work, Mueller and Spinnewijn analyze how perceptions evolve during the unemployment
spell using a survey of job seekers in New Jersey during the most recent recession. They nd an
optimistic bias that is as extreme in magnitude and persists during the unemployment spell.
The analysis in this paper ts well in the behavioral public economics literature, studying
optimal policies with non-standard decision makers.5 First, behavioral biases like biases in beliefs
2Moore and Healy (2008) provide an excellent overview. For seminal contributions, see for example Weinstein
(1980) and Slovic (2000). De Bondt and Thaler (1995) conclude: "Perhaps the most robust nding in the psychology
of judgment is that people are overcondent." In this literature, overcondence is often interpreted as over-estimation
of a probability relative to the true probability, which relates to my denition of baseline-optimism. However, it can
also refer to over-placement (i.e., the belief that one performs better than others) and over-precision (i.e., the belief
that ones information is more precise than it actually is).
3Examples are Gervais and Odean (2001), Bénabou and Tirole (2002 and 2006), Compte and Postlewaite (2004),
Van den Steen (2004), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Gollier (2005) and Köszegi (2006).
4See http://www.gallup.com/poll/145817/Unemployed-Americans-Face-Challenging-Job-Search.aspx.
5For reviews, see Kanbur et al. (2006), Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Mullainathan et al. (2012).
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distort behavior and thus a¤ect the need for public policies and their impact. In the context
of unemployment, DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) have analyzed theoretically how impatience
distorts job search behavior. Paserman (2008) has estimated the discounting process to evaluate
particular policy interventions numerically. Second, behavioral biases a¤ect how observed behavior
needs to be interpreted when designing policies. The characterization of the Baily formula adjusted
for biased beliefs adds to the recent literature, reviewed by Chetty (2009), analyzing conditions
under which su¢ cient statistic formulas for taxation and social insurance apply or need to be
adjusted. The empirical estimation of the bias in beliefs helps to identify agentstrue preferences
from their observed choices, as argued by Köszegi and Rabin (2007 and 2008). Finally, behavioral
biases may justify government intervention in insurance markets. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2004)
have argued that peoples poor understanding of risk and insurance choices is one of the reasons
for the divergence between insurance theory and insurance practice. In other contexts, previous
work has focused on the response by private rms to behavioral biases and the potential welfare
consequences (see Ellison 2006, DellaVigna 2009). In particular, Santos-Pinto (2008) and De la
Rosa (2011) analyze the change in incentive contracts proposed by a prot-maximizing principal
in response to specic optimistic biases.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a stylized two-period model and denes the
baseline and control beliefs. Section 3 derives an adjustment of the Baily formula characterizing
the optimal policy in the presence of biased beliefs. Section 4 introduces a dynamic model of the
unemployment spell and analyzes the features of the optimal policy in a dynamic context. Section
5 calibrates this dynamic model and provides some numerical explorations of the optimal policy
features and its welfare consequences. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented in appendix.
2 Stylized Model
I rst consider a two-period model that closely follows the seminal model of unemployment by Baily
(1978). A risk-averse agent is employed in the rst period, but faces the risk to be unemployed in
the second period. In the rst period, the agent decides how much to save to protect herself against
the loss of earnings when unemployed. In the second period, the agent decides how hard to search
for employment.
In each period, the agent earns a wage w when employed and 0 when unemployed. In the rst
period, the agent can save s 2 [0; w] to increase her consumption in the second period by (1 + r) s,
regardless of her employment status. In the second period, the agent nds work with probability
 (e) 2 [0; 1] when exerting search e¤ort at utility utility cost e  0. The job nding probability
is increasing, but concave in the search cost, 0 (e)  0, 00 (e) < 0. For notational convenience, I
assume that the agent is certain to lose her job after the rst period and is thus obliged to search
6A di¤erent set of papers focuses on the impact of heterogeneity in risk perceptions on the design of insurance
or other contracts. See for example Sandroni and Squintani (2007), Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Grubb (2009) and
Spinnewijn (2012, 2013).
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for a new job in the second period.7
The social planner provides mandatory insurance against the unemployment risk. The agent
receives a benet b when unemployed, but pays a tax  when employed. The insurance reduces
the wedge between employment and unemployment consumption. The policy cannot be made
conditional on the agents behavior, but a¤ects how much she saves when employed in the rst
period and how much search e¤ort she exerts after being displaced in the second period. The
expected utility of an unemployment policy (b; ) for an agent with Bernouilli-utility function u ()
and discount factor  who saves s and exerts e¤ort e equals
u(w      s) +  [ (e)u(w    + (1 + r) s) + (1   (e))u(b+ (1 + r) s)  e] .
I will use c0, ce and cu as short-hands of the consumption levels in the rst period of employment,
the second period when employed and the second period when unemployed respectively.
2.1 Biased Beliefs
The agents behavior depends on her perceived employment prospects. I allow the agents be-
lief regarding her job nding probability to be di¤erent from the true probability. I denote by
^ (e) 2 [0; 1] the agents belief when exerting e¤ort e. Like the true probability  (e), the perceived
probability ^ (e) is increasing and concave in e. I deliberately put no other restrictions on how the
true and perceived probability are related. The analysis, however, will show that the di¤erence is
essential in two dimensions; the di¤erence in levels ^ (e)  (e), the baseline bias, and the di¤erence
in margins ^0 (e)  0 (e), the control bias.
Denition 1 An agent is baseline-optimistic (-pessimistic) if ^ (e)  ()  (e)for all e  0.
Denition 2 An agent is control-optimistic (-pessimistic) if ^0 (e)  () 0 (e) for all e  0.
Baseline and control beliefs are interdependent. Whether baseline-optimistic agents are also
more optimistic about their control may depend on the context, as illustrated by the following two
examples constructed by using an increasing, but concave function  (e).8
Example 1:  (e) =    (e) and ^ (e) = ^   (e); the probability of nding work is comple-
mentary in the job seekers ability  and e¤ort e. A job seeker who overestimates her ability (i.e.,
^ > ) is at the same time baseline-optimistic and control-optimistic.
Example 2: 1    (e) =   [1   (e)] and 1   ^ (e) = ^  [1   (e)]; a job seeker who
underestimates the probability to remain unemployed when exerting no search e¤ort (i.e., ^ < )
will be baseline-optimistic, but will also underestimate the return to reducing this probability by
searching and thus be control-pessimistic.
7For notational convenience, I do not consider the possibility that the worker retains her job, which would introduce
an additional state. Still, an alternative interpretation of the model is that the agent exerts e¤ort to keep her job in
order to capture moral hazard on-the-job.
8Note that the theoretical results apply for any baseline and control bias. For expositional purposes, I do restrict
attention to biases in beliefs that are the same for all e¤ort levels, although only the bias in beliefs evaluated at the
chosen e¤ort level will matter.
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2.2 Agents Problem
The agent chooses an e¤ort level e and savings level s to maximize her perceived expected utility
taking the unemployment policy (b; ) as given,
U^ (b; ) = max
e;s
u(w      s) +  [^ (e)u(w    + (1 + r) s) + (1  ^ (e))u(b+ (1 + r) s)  e] :
At an interior solution, the levels equalize the respective perceived individual benet and cost at
the margin,
^0 (e) [u(ce)  u(cu)]  1 = 0, (ICe)
 u0 (c0) +  (1 + r)

^ (e)

u0(ce)  u0(cu)

+ u0(cu)
	
= 0. (ICs)
From ICe, it follows that the agent exerts more e¤ort the higher she perceives the marginal
return to e¤ort to be. As a consequence, her e¤ort and thus her probability of nding work is
higher when she is control-optimistic than when she is control-pessimistic. This is true as long as
the consumption wedge ce  cu is positive. The more insurance the unemployment policy provides,
the smaller the consumption wedge. The agent responds by decreasing her search e¤ort and more
so if she is control-optimistic.
From ICs, it follows that the agent saves less the higher she perceives the job nding probability
to be. This is true as long as the consumption wedge ce cu is positive by concavity of the Bernouilli
utility. In contrast with the e¤ort choice, the consumption choice depends on the baseline beliefs. A
baseline-optimistic agent underestimates the value of unemployment insurance and protects herself
less against the unemployment risk through precautionary savings. The less the unemployment
policy insures the agent against the loss of earnings, the larger her incentive to save.9
3 Optimal Unemployment Policy
The social planner faces the trade-o¤ between providing insurance and maintaining incentives for
search. The agents perception of her employment prospects is central to this trade-o¤.
3.1 Social Planners Problem
The expected expenditures and revenues for the social planner depend on the agents true em-
ployment probabilities. I assume that the social planner is paternalistic and also uses these true
probabilities to weight the di¤erent states when calculating the agents expected utility.10 While
9Since the earnings distribution in the second period is rst-order stochastically dominated by the earnings in
the rst period, u000 > 0 is not necessary to explain precautionary savings for the unemployment risk. By implicit
di¤erentation of ICs, it follows that the savings level increases in response to a decrease in b (i.e., dsdb < 0) regardless
of the sign of u000. For the savings level to increase in response to a decrease in  , u000 > 0 is not necessary either, but
su¢ cient.
10The insights generalize for welfare concepts putting some positive weight on the agents perceived expected utility.
In the web-appendix, I contrast the optimal policy under this extreme welfare criterion with the policy implemented
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only the true probabilities enter the social planners problem directly, they still depend on the
agents behavior and thus on the agents beliefs. I assume that the social planner knows the agents
beliefs, which cannot be manipulated, nor changed in response to the unemployment policy.11
Hence, the social planner solves
max
b;
u(w      s) +  [ (e)u(w    + (1 + r) s) + (1  (e))u(b+ (1 + r) s)  e]
subject to ICe; ICs and
 +
1
1 + r
[ (e)    (1   (e)) b] = 0. (BC)
I denote the agents true expected utility by U (b; ) and the social planners prot by P (b; ). For
any unemployment benet level b, the incentive compatibility constraints and the budget constraint
implicitly determine a tax level ~ (b), an e¤ort choice ~e (b) and a savings choice ~s (b). I assume that
these functions are well-behaved for the relevant range of values for b with ~ 0 (b) > 0, ~e0 (b)  0 and
~s0 (b)  0 and drop the argument when it is clear.
For the unemployment policy to be optimal, a budget-balanced increase in the unemployment
benet b cannot increase the agents welfare,
dU
db
= 0 , @U
@b
+
@U
@
~ 0 (b) +
@U
@e
~e0 (b) +
@U
@s
~s0 (b) = 0. (1)
An increase in the unemployment benet b has three types of e¤ects. First, it directly increases
the agents utility when unemployed. Second, it requires an increase in the tax to keep the budget
balanced and thus a¤ects the agents utility when employed. Third, it changes the agents behavior:
the agent reduces her search e¤ort e and her savings s. With unbiased beliefs, these behavioral
responses have only a second-order impact on the agents expected utility by the envelope condition.
That is, if the agent were to maximize her true expected utility, the last two terms in equation
(1) would drop and the social planner could ignore the utility impact of any behavioral response.
This is a key force in the analysis by Baily (1978) and the su¢ cient statistic literature in public
economics (see Chetty 2006, 2009). However, this no longer applies when an agent has biased
beliefs and maximizes her perceived rather than her true expected utility.
I relate the rst-order utility impact of these behavioral responses when beliefs are biased to the
standard moral hazard cost and consumption smoothing benet from an increase in unemployment
benets.
Moral Hazard: Perceived Returns to Search Higher unemployment benets lower the in-
centives for an unemployed agent to search for work. Moral hazard arises as the agent does not
internalize the impact of her e¤ort on the social planners expected revenues and expenditures.
by a populist government catering to its votersbeliefs. Such government would propose the same policy as prot-
maximizing insurers in a competitive equilibrium. I briey discuss this in Section 3.3.
11These assumptions correspond to a setting with di¤erent priors where the social planner and the agent agree to
disagree.
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The tax increase required to balance the budget is larger the more responsive the agents search
e¤ort. The impact of this behavioral response on the social planners budget is fully captured by
the elasticity of the unemployment probability with respect to a budget-balanced increase in the
unemployment benet. That is, the required tax increase equals
~ 0 (b) =
~ (b)
b

1 + "1 (~e);b

, with "1 (~e);b 
d (1   (~e (b)))
db
b
1   (~e (b)) . (2)
The higher the elasticity, the worse the rate at which the social planner can transfer consumption
from employment to unemployment and thus the more costly it is to provide insurance against
unemployment.
The agents biased beliefs introduce a second externality related to her e¤ort choice, which I
refer to as a search internality. If the perceived and true marginal return to search di¤er, the agent
does not correctly internalize the e¤ect of her search e¤ort on her true expected utility. The social
planner a¤ects this search internality when changing the unemployment policy. Using ICe, I nd
@U
@e
~e0 (b) = 

0 (~e)  ^0 (~e) [u(ce)  u(cu)] ~e0 (b) . (3)
With unbiased control beliefs, this e¤ect is of second order. However, when the agent is control-
pessimistic, 0 () > ^0 (), she underestimates the marginal return to e¤ort and exerts too little e¤ort
given the true return. A decrease in her e¤ort choice in response to an increase in unemployment
benets now causes a rst-order decrease in welfare. When the agent is control-optimistic, the
opposite happens. In fact, the positive search internality due to her control-optimistic beliefs may
o¤set the negative externality due to moral hazard and thus reduce the incentive cost from providing
unemployment insurance.
Consumption Smoothing: Perceived Value of Insurance Unemployment benets provide
insurance by reducing the wedge between employment and unemployment consumption. The wel-
fare gain from a budget-balanced increase in the unemployment benet is increasing in the wedge
between the marginal utility of consumption when employed and unemployed. Ignoring behavioral
responses, the normalized utility gain equals
[
@U
@b
+
@U
@
~ (b)
b
]=[ @U
@
~ (b)
b
] =
u0 (cu)  u0 (ce)
u0 (ce)
, (4)
for  (1 + r) = 1 and u0 (ce)  [u0 (c0) +  (~e)u0 (ce)] = [1 +  (~e)] denoting the average (dis-
counted) marginal utility when employed. The relative di¤erence in marginal utilities and thus the
consumption smoothing benet of the unemployment policy is decreasing in the benet b and tax
 .
Higher unemployment benets also reduce the gains from self-protection against the unem-
ployment risk. The social planners unemployment policy crowds out the agents precautionary
savings. The welfare impact of the crowd-out response when considering a marginal change in the
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unemployment policy is again of second order if agents have unbiased beliefs. Using ICx, I nd
@U
@s
~s0 (b) =  (1 + r) [^ (~e)   (~e)] u0(cu)  u0(ce) ~s0 (b) . (5)
When the agent is baseline-optimistic about her employment prospects, ^ (e) >  (e), she saves
too little to protect herself against unemployment. A further decrease in her precautionary savings
in response to an increase in the unemployment benet thus causes a rst-order decrease in her
expected utility.
3.2 Adjusted Baily Formula
Using the above expressions, the optimality condition (1) can be rewritten to nd a Baily formula
adjusted for biased beliefs. The formula states that when setting unemployment benets the gain
from providing insurance and the cost from reducing the search incentives have to be equalized at
the margin.
Proposition 1 The optimal unemployment policy is characterized by
u0(cu)  u0 (ce)
u0 (ce)

1  ^ (~e)   (~e)
1   (~e) I (b)

= "1 (~e);b

1  ^
0 (~e)  0 (~e)
0 (~e)
J (b)

; (6)
for I (b) =  u0(cu) u0(ce)u0(cu) u0(ce)
~s0(b)
  0, J (b) = u(ce) u(cu)bu0(ce)  0 and  (1 + r) = 1.
When beliefs are unbiased, condition (6) simplies to the standard Baily formula12,
u0 (cu)  u0 (ce)
u0 (ce)
= "1 (~e);b. (7)
This formulation by Baily (1978) is central in the recent literature in public nance developing and
implementing su¢ cient statistic formulasfor social insurance (Chetty 2009). The Baily formula
suggests that the identication of two moments is su¢ cient to guide policy design. If the relative
di¤erence in marginal utilities exceeds the elasticity "1 (~e);b, an increase in the unemployment
benet increases welfare. The larger the di¤erence in marginal utilities or the smaller the elasticity,
the higher the expected welfare gain. Identifying the primitives underlying the agents search and
savings decision is not necessary. The appeal of this approach is thus that policy recommendations
can be based on a small set of high-level empirical moments, which have been credibly estimated in
the empirical literature.13 However, when biased beliefs distort a job seekers behavior, the Baily
formula prescribes an unemployment benet level that is generally suboptimal. The direction
12Note that the second order condition of the social planners maximization problem requires that u
0(cu) u0(ce)
u0(ce)
decreases more in b than "1 (~e);b.
13A large literature has analyzed the unemployment responses to unemployment benets (see Krueger and Meyer
(2002) for a review). Gruber (1997) estimates the relative di¤erence in consumption when employed and unemployed
to approximate the relative di¤erence in marginal utilities, i.e., [u0 (cu)  u0 (ce)] =u0 (ce) = cc for relative risk
aversion parameter . See Shimer and Werning (2007) and Chetty (2008) for alternative implementations.
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in which the benet level should be adjusted depends only on the belief biases as illustrated in
Corollary 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 The elasticity "1 (~e);b overestimates (underestimates) the cost from reducing incen-
tives when agents have control-optimistic (-pessimistic) beliefs.
The cost from reduced incentives depends on both the moral hazard cost and the search inter-
nality. The search internality appears as a correction of the elasticity in the adjusted Baily formula
(6), which depends on the control bias. Ignoring this correction would lead the social planner to set
the unemployment benet suboptimally high for control-pessimistic agents and suboptimally low
for control-optimistic agents. Note that the social planner can correct the search internality only to
the extent that the agent is responsive to its policy. In case of a zero elasticity, for example when
the job seeker believes she has no control over her situation, she will not respond to changes in the
unemployment benets. This indicates the potential importance of other unemployment policies
to encourage search directly, like job search monitoring and job search assistance. The impact of
biased control beliefs on the optimal benet level itself is also ambiguous despite the unambiguous
correction in the formula. The reason is that control beliefs also a¤ect the standard moral hazard
cost (by changing the responsiveness and thus the elasticity "1 (~e);b) and consumption smoothing
benets (by changing e¤ort and thus the required tax ~ (b)) with potentially opposite e¤ects on
the optimal benet level. This can be easily seen when the control beliefs are either extremely
pessimistic or optimistic, since in both cases the optimal policy converges to full insurance (i.e.,
ce   cu ! 0).14
Corollary 2 The relative di¤erence [u0 (cu)  u0 (ce)] =u0 (ce) overestimates (underestimates) the
gain from providing insurance when agents have baseline-optimistic (-pessimistic) beliefs.
The gain from providing additional insurance depends on the relative di¤erence in marginal
utilities, but needs to be corrected for the crowd-out of savings when beliefs are biased. The
correction depends on the baseline bias. Note that baseline-optimistic agents save less to protect
themselves against the unemployment risk and thus gain more from higher unemployment benets.
This is reected by the higher relative di¤erence in marginal utilities due to the lower savings.
However, this relative di¤erence overstates the welfare gain from increasing unemployment benets.
This is due to the reduction in savings in response to the benet increase, although the savings are
already insu¢ cient. Similarly, baseline-pessimistic agent smooth their consumption more and thus
gain less from higher unemployment benets, but this gain is larger than indicated by the relative
di¤erence in marginal utilities.
14When the agent is extremely pessimistic about her control, the increase in search e¤orts when introducing a
(costly) wedge between employment and unemployment consumption is too low. When the agent is extremely
optimistic about her control, a small wedge would su¢ ce to induce her to exert the e¢ cient level of search.
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3.3 Self-Protection against Unemployment
The analysis highlights that workers who overestimate their job nding probability (or underesti-
mate their job loss probability) are expected to save too little and to be unprepared for the loss of
earnings when unemployed. The optimism about employment prospects might explain why many
unemployed individuals have limited liquidity (Chetty 2008) and raises doubts regarding the desir-
ability of individual unemployment savings accounts to provide protection against unemployment
as proposed by Altman and Feldstein (2006). The under-investment and its consequences for opti-
mal policy extend to any type of self-insurance against the unemployment risk that workers could
invest in. As such, the optimistic bias may provide an alternative explanation for the puzzle why
unemployment insurance is almost always publicly provided (Acemoglu and Shimer 2000). This
can be illustrated in an extended model with private insurance. The desirability of social insurance
depends on whether or not the equilibrium coverage provided by private insurers is socially optimal.
Like a social planner, private insurers are constrained by the true employment probabilities when
designing their policies. However, in order to attract agents with biased beliefs, they would o¤er
policies that maximize the agentsperceived rather than true expected utility. In particular, private
insurers would o¤er less insurance than is socially optimal in response to the low valuation implied
by baseline-optimistic beliefs. In addition, they would not adjust the coverage to correct for the
distortions in the agents search behavior driven by her biased control beliefs. Both e¤ects illustrate
why the well-known result that moral hazard, in contrast with adverse selection, does not raise the
need for government intervention (e.g., Chetty and Saez 2010) holds only if the agents beliefs are
unbiased. In the web-appendix to this paper, I show these insights formally by characterizing the
insurance policy provided by private insurers in a competitive equilibrium, which would coincide
with the optimal policy when beliefs are unbiased.15
4 Dynamic Model of the Unemployment Spell
The previous section characterized the optimal generosity of the unemployment policy focusing on
the role of biased beliefs for the incentives for workers to save for unemployment and for displaced
workers to leave unemployment. This section provides a complementary analysis of the role of
biased beliefs for the search and consumption choices of unemployed job seekers during the unem-
ployment spell and also studies the consequence for the optimal dynamics of the unemployment
policy. I consider a standard dynamic model of the unemployment spell in which a job seeker starts
unemployed and decides how much to search for employment as long as she has not found employ-
ment (see Shavell and Weiss 1979, Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997, Shimer and Werning 2008, etc.).
The job seeker has also access to assets which can be used to increase unemployment consumption
at the expense of future consumption and thus make consumption levels dependent on the length
of the unemployment spell.
15Note that this is also the policy that a non-paternalistic policy maker would propose when trying to gain the
agents vote in elections.
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I consider the case of CARA preferences for which Werning (2002) and Shimer and Werning
(2008) show that the social optimum is achieved with constant unemployment benets and taxes
when job seekers are not liquidity constrained. First, I show how the optimal characterization of
this constant policy generalizes the previous insights of the adjusted Baily formula to this dynamic
setting. Note that both the e¤ort and savings decision will now depend on the perceived length
of the unemployment spell. Baseline-optimistic job seekers search too little and draw down their
assets too quickly given the true expected duration. The latter implies that access to liquidity
is no longer su¢ cient to achieve the social optimum. Finally, I also show how the social planner
could increase the welfare of baseline-optimistic agents by increasing the unemployment benets
and taxes with the length of the unemployment spell.
4.1 Setup
The agent now starts unemployed and exerts e¤ort at cost e to nd work. She nds a job with
probability  (e) in a given period, but she believes this probability to be equal to ^ (e). If the agent
does not nd work in a given period, she has to search again in the next period. Once she nds a
job, she remains employed forever.16,17 I assume CARA preferences with the cost of e¤ort expressed
in monetary terms, u (c  e) =   exp (  (c  e)). Next to the unemployment benets and taxes,
the agent has also access to a risk-free asset a with interest rate r to smooth her consumption. The
agents discount factor equals  with  (1 + r) = 1.
I consider the constant policy (b; ) specifying the constant benet b received when unemployed
and the constant tax  paid when re-employed. An agent with CARA preferences makes her search
and consumption decision based only on di¤erences in income levels. With a constant policy, these
di¤erences remain the same throughout the unemployment spell.
Lemma 1 An agent with CARA preferences facing a constant policy (b; ) exerts a stationary
e¤ort level e^ and depletes her asset holdings by a stationary amount x^. The perceived continuation
value in unemployment equals
U^ (b;  ja) =
u (cu (a)  e^) + 1  ^ (e^)u (ce (a)  rx^)
1  ^ (e^; x^) , (8)
with ^ (e^; x^)   (1  ^ (e^)) exp (rx^).
The stationarity makes the problem particularly tractable and allows for a closed-form expres-
sion for the continuation value in unemployment with a simple interpretation: each period that
16 It is possible to introduce a spell of employment at the start in the spirit of the stylized two-period model. This
would conrm the earlier insights and not a¤ect the dynamic results. Note that in the dynamic model e¤ort exerted
in a given period of unemployment a¤ects employment in the next period, which is di¤erent from the stylized model.
17 I assume that job seekers do not learn about their bias during unemployment; both the true probability function
of e¤ort  (e) and the perceived probability function of e¤ort ^ (e) remain unchanged during unemployment. In
the web-appendix, I discuss empirical evidence suggesting that the optimistic baseline bias does not decrease during
unemployment.
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the job seeker starts unemployed she receives a utility ow that depends on her unemployment
utility and the expected utility from potentially becoming employed. This utility ow is discounted
by ^ (e; x) which in addition to the discount factor  depends on the perceived probability of
unemployment and the rate at which the utility ow decreases through asset depletion.
The agents e¤ort level solves
^0 (e) exp (rx)

u (ce (a))
1     U^ (b;  ja)

= u0 (cu (a)  e) : (IC 0e)
Her e¤ort now depends on her baseline beliefs as well. A baseline-optimistic job seeker overesti-
mates the probability of leaving unemployment and thus the continuation value in unemployment
U^ (b;  ja). As a consequence, she exerts less e¤ort to leave unemployment. The agents consumption
levels during unemployment and upon re-employment equal respectively,
cu (a) =
r
1 + r
a+ b+ x,
ce (a) =
r
1 + r
a+ (w   ) .
The static wedge between employment and unemployment consumption is decreasing in the unem-
ployment benet and the tax as in the two-period model. A job seeker can now decrease this static
wedge by running down her savings at the expense of future consumption. That is, when increasing
todays unemployment consumption by x, it is optimal to reduce all future consumption levels by
rx, whether employed or unemployed. The reduction of the static wedge by x thus introduces a
dynamic wedge rx measuring the slope of the decreasing prole of unemployment consumption.
The job seeker trades o¤ this static and dynamic wedge and sets x to solve
u0 (cu   e)  u0 (ce)
u0 (cu   e) =
1
^ (e)

1  1
exp (rx)

, (ICx)
where 1=^ (e) equals the job seekers belief regarding the expected duration of her unemployment
spell. The left-hand side captures the value of a reduction in the static wedge, while the right-hand
side captures the cost from an increase in the dynamic wedge. The shorter a job seeker expects to
remain unemployed, the more willing she is to run down her savings during unemployment in order
to reduce the static wedge.
4.2 Adjusted Baily Formula
The social planner again sets the benet level of a budget-balanced policy to maximize the agents
true expected utility, constrained by the agents e¤ort and consumption choices. Budget balance
for a constant policy simplies to  = rb= (e). The required tax to balance the budget is higher
the longer the true expected duration of the unemployment spell 1= (e). Like in the two-period
model, the constraints implicitly dene three functions ~ (b) ; ~e (b) and ~x (b) and the optimal benet
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level b satises
dU
db
= 0 , @U
@b
+
@U
@
~ 0 (b) +
@U
@e
~e0 (b) +
@U
@x
~x0 (b) = 0. (9)
This condition allows for a Baily-type characterization of the optimal constant policy in this dy-
namic setting. Note that at the optimum both the search e¤ort and the depletion level are de-
creasing in response to a budget-balanced increase in the unemployment benet, i.e. ~e0 (b)  0 and
~x0 (b)  0.
Proposition 2 With CARA preferences, the optimal constant policy is characterized by
u0 (cu   ~e)  u0 (ce   r~x)
u0 (ce   r~x)

1 +
^ (~e)   (~e)
1  ^ (~e) K (b)

= "1=(~e);b
(
1  (1  
0 (~e)
^0 (~e)
1  ^ (~e; ~x)
1   (~e; ~x))L (b)
)
,
where K (b) =  ~x
0(b)
1 ^(~e;~x)  0 and L (b) =
u0(cu ~e)
u0(ce)b
(~e)
0(~e)  0.
The Proposition shows how the Baily formula and the adjustment for biased beliefs generalize in
this dynamic setting. The insurance gain is simply captured by the drop in the marginal utility of
consumption for an agent exiting unemployment, i.e., [u0 (cu   e)  u0 (ce   r~x)] =u0 (ce   rx). Note
that this drop depends on both the static and dynamic consumption wedge, which are related
through the job seekers savings choice in ICx. The incentive cost is simply captured by the
elasticity of the expected unemployment duration with respect to a budget-balanced increase in
the benet, "1=(~e);b  d ln (1= (~e)) =d ln b.
Both sides of the Baily-type expression are again corrected for the rst-order welfare impact of
the job seekers behavioral responses to the policy change. The correction for the search internality
now depends on both the baseline and control bias. If the job seeker is either control-pessimistic
or baseline-optimistic such that the ratio 0 (e) [1   ^ (e; x)]=f^0 (e) [1   (e; x)]g > 1, the job
seekers reduced search e¤ort in response to an increase in unemployment benets has a negative
rst-order impact on welfare. The elasticity "1=(~e);b would underestimate the incentive cost like
in Corollary 1. The correction for the job seekers savings response depends on the bias in the
baseline beliefs. A baseline-optimistic job seeker depletes her assets too quickly to increase her
unemployment consumption. By slowing down this rate, an increase in the unemployment benets
now implies a positive, rst-order e¤ect on welfare. This contrasts with the e¤ect on precautionary
savings during employment in the two-period model. A baseline-optimistic worker saves too little
for unemployment. An increase in unemployment benets further reduces her precautionary savings
and thus decreases welfare in the two-period model.18
4.3 Insurance vs. Liquidity
The distortion in the consumption choice during the unemployment spell when beliefs are biased
raises questions concerning the use of unemployment policies that rely on an agents discretionary
18More formally, in the respective models ~s0 (b)  0 and ~x0 (b)  0, but @U
@s
 0 in the two-period stylized model
and @U
@x
 0 in the dynamic unemployment model for baseline-optimistic agents.
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use of her assets to protect herself against unemployment. In the spirit of individual unemployment
savings accounts, Shimer and Werning (2008) argue that when workers have access to liquidity to
smooth their consumption during the unemployment spell, the unemployment policy should pri-
marily focus on the provision of insurance. In particular, they show that in a McCall (1970) search
model with CARA preferences, the optimal unemployment policy is implemented with constant
benets and taxes as long as job seekers can freely borrow and save. The dynamic wedge im-
plied by a job seekers asset depletion is thus exactly optimal from the social planners perspective.
This, however, does no longer hold when a job seeker underestimates the expected duration of her
unemployment spell.
I study this issue in a model with costly search. I contrast the job seekers depletion rate with
the rate the social planner would set when controlling the job seekers savings at zero cost. For
the asset depletion to be socially optimal, a budget-balanced increase in x should not increase
welfare accounting for the agents behavioral responses. In particular, if x increases, the job seeker
will search harder which relaxes the planners budget constraint so that the unemployment benet
could be increased. Denoting by b (x) and e (x) the benet and e¤ort level implied by IC 0e and the
budget constraint at x, I nd
dU
dx
= 0 , @U
@x
+
@U
@b
b0 (x) +
@U
@e
e0 (x) = 0, (10)
with e0 (x)  0 and b0 (x)  0. The condition allows for a Baily-type characterization of the optimal
dynamics.
Proposition 3 With CARA preferences and controlled savings, the unemployment policy satises
u0 (cu   e)  u0 (ce)
u0 (cu   e) =
1
 (e)

1  1
exp (rx)

 
(
b  (1  
0 (e)
^0 (e)
1  ^ (e; x)
1   (e; x))
 (e)
0 (e)
)
1   (e; x)
 (e)x exp (rx)
"1=(e);x.
Like the agent, the social planner trades o¤ the static and dynamic wedge when determining
the asset depletion rate x. The trade-o¤ in the Proposition is directly comparable to the agents
trade-o¤ expressed in ICx. In contrast with the agent, the social planner uses the true rather
than the perceived expected unemployment duration in the rst term on the right-hand side to
evaluate this trade-o¤. This would lead the social planner to set x lower than a baseline-optimistic
job seeker. Hence, reducing the job seekers excessive asset depletion for example by restricting
her access to savings or by taxing her withdrawals during unemployment would increase welfare.19
However, the social planner must also account for the positive e¤ect on search when increasing x,
as captured by the second term on the right-hand side. Higher x yields higher welfare by making
19Note that decreasing the unemployment benets and increasing taxes upon re-employment at the same rate with
the length of the unemployment spell like in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) would not be e¤ective in changing the
consumption prole since job seekers would adjust their savings to undo such policy.
16
an increase in unemployment benets feasible and by correcting a negative search internality (if
0 (e) [1   ^ (e; x)]=f^0 (e) [1   (e; x)]g > 1). The two latter e¤ects would lead the social planner
to set x higher than the job seeker. The welfare gain from restricting the access to savings might
thus disappear in a costly search model due to its negative e¤ect on search.20
4.4 Timing of Incentives
An important aspect for the design of unemployment policies is that the treatment of the long-
term unemployed a¤ects the incentives for the short-term unemployed: both the search incentives
in order to avoid being long-term unemployed and the saving incentives in order to prepare for long-
term unemployment. In particular, the threat to receive low benets when long-term unemployed
increases the incentives to search already when short-term unemployed. The e¤ectiveness of this
threat, however, depends on the perceived probability to be long-term unemployed. The above
analysis considered a policy which keeps the subsidy to unemployment b+  constant and provides
the same incentives throughout the unemployment spell. This constant subsidy provides a lower
bound on the attainable welfare of unemployment policies, which is tight in case of a McCall search
model with CARA preferences and unbiased beliefs (Shimer and Werning 2008). This is no longer
true when job seekers have biased beliefs. The reason is exactly that biased beliefs cause policies
for the long-term unemployed to have a di¤erential impact on the true and perceived continuation
value of unemployment. However, only the impact of the future policy on the perceived continuation
value a¤ects an unemployed job seekers behavior today.
Consider the same budget-balanced increase in the constant benet and tax considered in section
4.2, but only implemented after one period of unemployment, which I denote by db1. This a¤ects
the true and perceived continuation of unemployment after one period of unemployment denoted
by U1 and U^1 respectively. If the perceived continuation value changes, this policy change also
a¤ects behavior at the start of the unemployment spell, which I denoted by e0 and x0. The impact
on welfare at the start of the spell therefore equals
dU
db1
=

@U
@e0
+
@U
@P
@P
@e0

@e0
@U^1
+
@U0
@x0
@x0
@U^1

dU^1
db1
+  (1   (e0)) dU1
db1
. (11)
Starting from the optimal constant policy, the marginal change has no rst-order impact on the
continuation value of unemployment after one period of unemployment (i.e., dU1=db1 = 0). Since
the baseline-optimistic agent tends to prefer an unemployment policy with lower benets and taxes,
the budget-balanced increase lowers her perceived utility (i.e., dU^1=db1 < 0). This holds, unless the
social planner sets the unemployment benet very low relative to the standard Baily formula to
correct for a negative search internality.21 Hence, the decrease in perceived utility induces the job
20Note that the positive e¤ect of x on search and thus the exit rate out of unemployment is not present in a McCall
search model considered by Shimer and Werning (2008). In that model, agents who overestimate the arrival rate of
job o¤ers would set their reservation wage too high and thus leave unemployment too slowly, but this is not a¤ected
by the rate at which assets are depleted.
21There exists a positive upper bound , explicitly characterized in the proof and increasing in the baseline bias,
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seeker to increase her search e¤ort e0 and to reduce her consumption from savings x0 in the rst
period of unemployment. Both behavioral responses increase her true expected utility U when she
is baseline-optimistic. Moreover, the increase in search e¤ort relaxes the social planners budget P ,
which allows for a further increase in the agents welfare.
Proposition 4 With unbiased beliefs and unobservable savings, the optimal unemployment policy
is constant. If beliefs are baseline-optimistic and the search internality is relatively small, welfare
is increased by increasing benets and taxes for the long-term unemployed.
Limiting or reducing unemployment benets in time has been a central topic in the policy
debate and the literature on optimal unemployment insurance. The papers by Shavell and Weiss
(1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) have argued that this results from the optimal trade-
o¤ between smoothing consumption and providing incentives. Shimer and Werning (2008) show
that by providing liquidity to the unemployed, the negative duration-dependence of consumption
can be optimally implemented with constant benets. The Proposition takes this result one step
further suggesting that when job seekers are baseline-optimistic, unemployment benets could be
increasing during the unemployment spell. Insurance can be provided to the long-term unemployed
at a relatively low incentive cost for the short-term unemployed.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, I calibrate the dynamic model of the unemployment spell. I calculate the optimal
unemployment policy for di¤erent specications of the underlying beliefs under di¤erent saving
scenarios.
Calibration. The true probability function and perceived probability function in this numer-
ical exercise are of the form  (e) = 0 + 1e and ^ (e) = ^0 + ^1e. I use the reported search
intensity in Price et al. (1998) and its relation with the actual and expected unemployment duration
to calibrate these functions. The monetary cost of search e¤ort  u (e) =  0e
 1 and the constant
cost of work  e are calibrated to match an elasticity of the unemployment duration to unemploy-
ment benets of  0:5 and a monthly exit rate of 0:188. These values correspond to respectively the
empirical estimates of duration elasticities reviewed in Krueger and Meyer (2002) and the average
exit rate in the sample of a survey of unemployed job seekers in the US by Price et al. (1998). I
calculate the optimal policy for di¤erent values of the baseline and control bias. The elicited ex-
pectations of the unemployment duration in Price et al. (1998) suggest an optimistic baseline bias
[^ (e)   (e)] = (e) = [^0   0 + (^1   1) e] = (e) of around 200%. To evaluate the importance
of the baseline bias, I consider a range of values for ^0 implying a baseline bias between 0% 200%
(keeping ^1 = 1). In the sample, the baseline bias is negatively related to the reported search
e¤ort across job seekers. Controlling for other observable characteristics, I nd that the actual
unemployment spell is on average 3:4 weeks shorter for subjects who report to search at double the
such that 
0(~e)
^0(~e)
1 ^(~e;~x)
1 (~e;~x)  1 +  is su¢ cient for dU^1db1 < 0.
18
frequency, but the expected unemployment spell is only 2:0 weeks shorter (see Table B.2). Taken
at face value, this would suggest a pessimistic control bias

^0 (e)  0 (e) =0 (e) = [^1   1] =1 of
 67%, but this result could also be driven by reversed causality or unobserved heterogeneity. To
evaluate the importance of the control bias, I consider a range of values for ^1 implying a control
bias between  100 and 100% (keeping ^0 = 0). Note that changes in ^1 will also a¤ect the
baseline bias. The details of the regression specications and the calibration are in the appendix.
Optimal Static Policy (No savings). I rst consider rst the optimal staticpolicy. That
is, the optimal constant policy (b; ) when the unemployed agent has no access to any assets such
that consumption is independent of the length of unemployment. The left panels of Figures C.1
and C.2 in appendix show the net unemployment subsidy b+    for di¤erent belief parameters
with  =  u (e)  e. Given that the costs of e¤ort are expressed in monetary terms, the subsidy
is presented net of these costs. In the absence of savings, the static wedge between the marginal
utility of consumption when employed and unemployed is determined by the wage minus this net
subsidy, w   [b+    ]. I scaled the wage to 1 such that the results can be interpreted in
percentage terms relative to output. The right panels show the monthly exit probability out of
unemployment. Both baseline-optimistic beliefs and control-pessimistic beliefs increase the cost of
providing incentives and thus reduce the exit rate implied by the optimal policy. The monthly exit
probability decreases from :20 to :18 for the range of baseline beliefs and increases from :14 to :21
for the range of control beliefs. As discussed before, the impact of biased beliefs on the optimal
policy itself is ambiguous and, in the absence of savings, the beliefs only a¤ect the search e¤ort.
For di¤erent values of the baseline beliefs, the optimal unemployment subsidy remains around :88,
implying a static wedge of around :12. The changes are more pronounced for di¤erent control beliefs.
In particular, the unemployment subsidy increases to 1 when the control beliefs become extremely
pessimistic. The static wedge disappears as providing incentives becomes useless. As discussed in
Section 3.3, private insurers would accommodate the job seekerschanging perception of the value
of insurance and thus lower the unemployment subsidy when the job seekers are baseline-optimistic.
I calculate the unemployment subsidy that they would provide in a competitive equilibrium as a
natural benchmark for the unemployment policy.22 When the optimistic baseline bias increases
to 200%, the net unemployment subsidy decreases to about 0:5. This approximately equals the
cost di¤erential   implying that the underlying unemployment benet level is close to 0. At
200%, the baseline bias makes it unprotable for private insurers to provide positive unemployment
benets in this model.23
Optimal Dynamic Policy (With Savings). I now consider the optimal dynamicpolicy.
That is, the optimal constant policy (b; ) when the agent has free access to a riskless asset such
that the agents consumption decreases linearly with the length of the unemployment spell at rate
rx. The left panel in Figure C.3 contrasts this dynamic wedge with the static wedge which is now
22The characterization of the competitive equilibrium discussed in section 3.3 and derived in the web appendix
naturally generalizes for the dynamic model.
23The lower subsidy relative to the optimal policy induces more search as well. The monthly exit rates are up to
2 percentage points larger than in the social optimum.
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reduced by x (i.e., w   [b+    ]  x). Both wedges are evaluated given the optimal policy for
di¤erent baseline beliefs. The rst thing to notice is that the optimal static wedge falls below :01
when the job seeker has access to savings (from about :12 in the absence of savings). The assets
allow using all future periods in this innite-horizon model to smooth the loss of income during
unemployment. With unbiased beliefs, the static wedge equals :009 for the optimal policy, while the
dynamic wedge equals just above :002. This dynamic wedge increases substantially when the agent
underestimates how long she will remain unemployed. For a baseline bias of 200%, the dynamic
wedge has increased above :004 while the static wedge has decreased to below :007. In other words,
while the consumption of someone who nds work immediately is hardly 1% higher than the net
consumption of an unemployed job seeker at the start of spell, this di¤erence increases by almost 1%
for any additional two months in unemployment. A job seeker who nds work only after two years
consumes almost 10% less (in each remaining period of her innite life). The right panel shows the
unemployment subsidy b +     and the asset depletion x underlying the static and dynamic
wedge. The optimal policy involves a lower unemployment subsidy for baseline-optimistic agents,
but the static wedge between employment and unemployment consumption is still smaller since the
baseline-optimistic agent uses more of her assets to increase her unemployment consumption. I also
calculate the optimal policy when the social planner can directly control savings and thus e¤ectively
determine the (linear) rate at which consumption decreases with the length of unemployment as in
Proposition 3. Surprisingly, this rate is hardly di¤erent, even for optimistic baseline beliefs, which
indicates that the static unemployment subsidy adjusts to induce a similar dynamic wedge.24
Welfare. Figure C.4 compares the welfare impact of the above policies by showing compen-
sating variations that make an unemployed job seeker without the policy as well of as with the
policy. The compensating variation is expressed as the present value of a constant consumption
ow, which is between one and two months worth of output in this numerical exercise. Providing
access to savings (i.e., switching from a static to a dynamic unemployment policy) substantially
increases the value of the unemployment policy as this allows to spread the unemployment risk
over all future periods. The value-added hardly depends on whether the access to savings can
be controlled or not. The adjustment of the unemployment subsidy to induce the unemployed to
deplete their savings at a desirable rate thus comes at a small cost, even when they are optimistic
about the duration of their unemployment spell. As a consequence, the value of the optimal policy
is fairly constant for di¤erent baseline beliefs. Note that the dynamic model allows biased beliefs
to distort the agents behavior only during the unemployment spell. In a more general model,
baseline beliefs would also a¤ect the agents willingness to protect against unemployment through
precautionary savings (or other self-insurance). The welfare of the policy provided in a competitive
equilibrium illustrates the potential magnitude of these e¤ects within this dynamic model. Private
insurers cater to the low value baseline-optimistic workers attach to unemployment protection by
24As discussed before, a baseline-optimistic agent may choose a higher depletion rate for a given unemployment
subsidy than is socially optimal. In this case of unobservable savings, the simulation nds a lower subsidy, but a
similar depletion rate. This indicates the importance of the positive incentive e¤ect of faster depletion during the
unemployment spell, which the agent does not account for.
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reducing the unemployment subsidy. Figure C.4 shows that the welfare of this policy is in fact
strongly decreasing in the baseline-optimistic bias and reaches zero for a bias of 200%.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that perceptions of employment prospects should be at the heart of the design
of unemployment policies. New evidence reveals a striking optimistic bias suggesting that workers
underestimate the unemployment risk and the risk of long unemployment spells in particular.
Optimistic workers invest too little to protect themselves against the loss of earnings. Optimistic job
seekers do too little to leave unemployment and will be unprepared for long unemployment spells.
A natural way to reduce the negative impact of optimistic beliefs is to provide better information.
Information policies have been successful in other areas (e.g. health risks), but may be challenging
in the context of unemployment. As long as the bias persists, the analysis in this paper shows that
the use of future incentives (e.g., time limits on unemployment benets) is particularly ine¤ective in
encouraging displaced workers to search harder or accept job o¤ers earlier on. Moreover, empirical
estimates of standard behavioral responses like the policy elasticity of unemployment become an
inaccurate guide for policy design since they get a di¤erent interpretation when a¤ected by biased
beliefs. This insight naturally extends to the design of other government policies based on so-called
"su¢ cient statistics". More generally, policy makers should be cautious when relying on individuals
actions to avoid risks or to protect themselves against their consequences. The strong optimistic
bias suggests that the use of private savings accounts or the reliance on the private provision of
insurance would be problematic. Competition would discipline private insurers to charge actuarially
fair prices, but not to correct the agents distorted choices. In fact, the low perceived value of
unemployment protection may help explain the puzzle why unemployment insurance is publicly
provided in almost all countries (Acemoglu and Shimer 2000).
The analysis highlights the importance of the control beliefs next to the beliefs about the
baseline risk. The empirical evidence on control beliefs is lagging and credible identication seems
particularly challenging. The experimental evidence on the illusion of control (see Langer 1975)
would suggest that job seekers are optimistic about the returns to their search e¤orts, but the many
unemployed who are not currently looking for employment because they are discouraged over job
prospects may well be underestimating these returns. For the job seekers in the study by Price et
al. (1998), I nd that those who report to search more frequently expect shorter unemployment
spells, but the reduction in the experienced unemployment spells is even larger. This result could
indicate that job seekers are control-pessimistic next to being baseline-optimistic. Both biases slow
down the exit out of unemployment and contribute to its persistence. Further research should
shed more light on this and investigate the role of job seekersperceptions for other unemployment
features. For example, the high incidence of long-term unemployment, in particular during the
Great Recession (Kroft et al., 2013), could be the result of beliefs adjusting slowly to deteriorating
employment prospects during the unemployment spell and during recessions.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The social planner solves
max
b
u(w   ~ (b)  ~s (b))+
 [ (~e (b))u (w   ~ (b) + (1 + r) ~s (b)) + (1  (~e (b)))u(b+ (1 + r) ~s (b))  ~e (b)] ,
where ~ (b) ; ~s (b) and ~e (b) are implicitly dened by the incentive compatibility constraints ICe; ICs
and the budget constraint BC. The implicit functions are assumed to be well-behaved such that
the optimal benet level is characterized by the rst-order condition
dU
db
= 0, @U
@b
+
@U
@
~ 0 (b) +
@U
@e
~e0 (b) +
@U
@s
~s0 (b) = 0, with
@U
@b
=  (1   (~e))u0(cu), @U
@
=  u0(c0)   (~e)u0 (ce)    (1 +  (~e)) u0 (ce) ;
~ 0 (b) =
1
1+r (1   (~e))
1 + 11+r (~e)

1 + "1 (~e);b

;
@U
@e
=   ^0 (~e)  0 (~e) [u(ce)  u(cu)] and
@U
@s
=  (1 + r) [^ (~e)   (~e)] u0(cu)  u0(ce) ,
where the last two expressions use ICe and ICs respectively. For "1 (~e);b =  0 (~e) b~e0 (b) = [1   (~e)]
and  (1 + r) = 1, we nd
dU
db
= (1   (~e)) = u0(cu)  u0 (ce)

1 + "1 (~e);b

+
^0 (~e)  0 (~e)
0 (~e)
u(ce)  u(cu)
b
"1 (~e);b
+
^ (~e)   (~e)
 (1   (~e))

u0(cu)  u0(ce)

~s0 (b) = 0,
u0(cu)  u0 (ce)
u0 (ce)

1  ^ (~e)   (~e)
1   (~e)
1

u0(cu)  u0(ce)
u0(cu)  u0 (ce)
  ~s0 (b)
= "1 (~e);b

1  ^
0 (~e)  0 (~e)
0 (~e)
u(ce)  u(cu)
bu0 (ce)

.
The adjusted Baily formula (6) for the social optimum directly follows from this expression.
Proof of Lemma 1
Denote the perceived expected utility of unemployed agent with assets a for an unemployment
policy z by U^ (zja). The assets are used by an agent with CARA preferences to increase consumption
in all states by the same amount r1+ra. For CARA utility, we have u (x+ y) = u (x) exp (y) and
u0 (x+ y) = u0 (x) exp (y). The marginal utilities determining the agents optimal consumption
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allocation and e¤ort choice are thus all rescaled by the same amount exp (r= (1 + r) a).
Facing a constant policy z = (b; ), an employed agent with assets a and CARA preferences
consumes her after-tax wage plus the interest on her asset level, ce (a) = r= (1 + r) a + w    . I
denote her consumption level when unemployed by cu (a) = r= (1 + r) a+ b+ x. When consuming
x more than her current income, her asset level decreases to a  (1 + r)x by the next period. This
decreases all her future consumption levels by rx. Her perceived expected utility when unemployed
can be written recursively with her assets a as the single state variable,
U^ (b;  ja) = max
e;x
u (cu (a)  e) + ^ (e) u (ce (a)  rx)
1   +  (1  ^ (e)) U^ (b;  ja  (1 + r)x) .
Using the property of CARA preferences, this can be rewritten as U^ (b;  ja) = exp (r= (1 + r) a) U^ (b;  j0).
Hence, the agents problem is stationary and she chooses the same e¤ort e^ and increase in con-
sumption x^ throughout the unemployment spell. From the recursive formulation, it then follows
that
U^ (b;  j0) =
u (b+ x^  e^) + ^ (e^) u(w  rx^)1 
1  ^ (e^; x^) ,
with ^ (e; x) =  (1  ^ (e)) exp (rx).
Proof of Proposition 2
The social planner maximizes the agents true expected utility given the implicit functions ~ (b) ; ~e (b)
and ~x (b) dened by IC 0e, ICx and the budget constraint  = rb= (e). That is
max
b
u

r
1+ra+ b+ ~x (b)  ~e (b)

+ 1  (~e (b))u

r
1+ra+ (w   ~ (b))  r~x (b)

1   (~e (b) ; ~x (b)) .
with  (e; x) =  (1   (e)) exp (rx). The rst-order condition equals
@U
@b
+
@U
@
~ 0 (b) +
@U
@e
~e0 (b) +
@U
@x
~x0 (b) = 0, with
@U
@b
+
@U
@
~ 0 (b) =

u0(cu   ~e)  u0(ce   r~x)
 
1 + "1=(~e);b

= [1   (~e; ~x)] , since
@U
@b
= u0(cu   ~e)= [1   (~e; ~x)] ; @U
@
=   
1   (~e)u
0(ce   r~x)= [1   (~e; ~x)] and
~ 0 (b) =
r
 (~e)

1 + "1=(~e);b

, and with,
@U
@e
=  
(
1  
0 (~e)
^0 (~e)
1  ^ (~e; ~x)
1   (~e; ~x)
)
u0 (cu   e)
1   (~e; ~x) , (12)
@U
@x
=   [^ (~e)   (~e)] exp (rx) [u
0 (cu   ~e)  u0 (ce)]
[1   (~e; ~x)]2 , (13)
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using IC 0e and ICx for the last two expressions. Using the above expressions in the FOC with
"1=(~e);b = 
0 (~e) b~e0 (b) = (~e) and [u0 (cu   ~e)  u0 (ce)] = [u0(cu   ~e)  u0(ce   r~x)] = [exp (rx) (1  ^ (~e))] 1
from ICx, I nd
dU
db
= 0, u
0(cu   ~e)  u0(ce   r~x)
u0(ce   r~x)

1 +
^ (~e)   (~e)
1  ^ (~e)
( ~x0 (b))
1   (~e; ~x)

= "1=(~e);b
"
1 
(
1  
0 (~e)
^0 (~e)
1  ^ (~e; ~x)
1   (~e; ~x)
)
u0 (cu   ~e)
u0(ce)b
 (~e)
0 (~e)
#
.
The adjusted Baily formula for the constant policy immediately follows. Note that for
Q (b) =
 ^00 (~e)
r^0 (~e)
  1

r +
u0 (ce)
u0 (cu   ~e) ^ (~e) exp (rx)

u0 (cu   ~e)  u0 (ce)
u0 (ce)
  exp (r~x) ~ 
0 (~e)
 (~e)
;
total di¤erentiation of the agents FOCs (IC 0e and ICx) yields
~e0 (b) =  exp (r~x)
Q (b)
and ~x0 (b) =  
(exp (r~x)  1)
 ^00(~e)
r^0(~e)   1

+ exp (r~x)
Q (b)
.
Hence, since ~e0 (b) < 0 for the optimal benet level, Q (b) > 0. This implies that ^00 (~e) = r^0 (~e) 
1 > 0 from the above expression for Q (b). Hence, ~x0 (b) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
When the social planner can set x at zero cost, he maximizes the agents true expected utility
with respect to (b;  ; x) such that IC 0e and the budget constraint  = rb= (e) are satised. At the
optimum, a budget-balanced increase in x cannot increase the agents welfare. Consider the case
where b is adjusted to keep the budget balanced. That is, IC 0e and the budget constraint implicitly
dene e (x) and b (x) when keeping  xed. Hence,
dU
dx
= 0, @U
@x
+
@U
@b
b0 (x) +
@U
@e
e0 (x) = 0, with
@U
@x
=
 (e) exp (rx)u0 (cu   e)
[1   (e; x)]2

u0 (cu   e)  u0 (ce)
u0 (cu   e)  
1
 (e)

1  1
exp (rx)

;
@U
@b
=
u0 (cu   e)
1   (e; x) and
@U
@e
=  
(
1  
0 (e)
^0 (e)
1  ^ (e; x)
1   (e; x)
)
u0 (cu   e)
1   (e; x) :
From total di¤erentiation of the incentive compatibility and budget constraint dening the implicit
functions, I nd
b0 (x) =
0 (e)
 (e)
be0 (x) and e0 (x) =
r + u
0(ce rx)
u0(cu e)
^0(e)
r (exp(rx)  1) ^00(e)
^0(e) + 1

1  ^ (e; x)
 ,
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implying e0 (x) > 0 and b0 (x) > 0. Using the expression for b0 (x) and "1=(e);x = 0 (e)xe0 (x) = (e),
dU
dx
= 0,

u0 (cu   e)  u0 (ce)
u0 (cu   e)  
1
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1  1
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
+
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#
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 (e; x)
 (e)x exp (rx)
"1=(e);x = 0.
The characterization of the optimal dynamic policy immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
I use subindex 0 to denote the variables values in the rst period of the unemployment spell and
subindex 1 to denote the variable values in all subsequent periods. The agents perceived expected
utility can be written recursively as
U^ (b; ) = max
x0;e0
u

r
1 + r
a+ b0 + x0   e0

+ ^ (e0)
24u

r
1+ra+ w   0   rx0

1   + (1  ^ (e0)) exp (rx0) U^ (b1; 1)
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The lower the agent perceives her expected utility when still unemployed in the next period
U^ (b1; 1), the lower her e¤ort e0 and the higher her depletion x0 in the rst period of unem-
ployment, i.e., @e0=@U^1 < 0; @x0=@U^1 > 0. With CARA preferences, her behavior in the rst
period does not a¤ect her future behavior.
Now start from the optimal constant policy (b; ) and consider a budget-balanced increase in
b and  like in Proposition 2, but only implemented after the rst period of unemployment. The
impact on the agents true expected utility equals
dU
db1
=

@U
@e0
+
@U
@P
@P
@e0

@e0
@U^1
+
@U
@x0
@x0
@U^1

| {z }
A
dU^1
db1
+  (1   (e0)) dU1
db1
, (14)
where U1 and U^1 denote the true and perceived unemployment continuation values after the rst
period of unemployment. Starting from the optimal contract, the budget-balanced increase in b1
after the rst period of unemployment has only a second-order impact on the true continuation
value by Proposition 2, i.e., dU1=db1 = 0. Hence, the second of the two terms in (14) equals zero.
The agents change in behavior at the start of the spell, however, a¤ects both her true expected
utility U and the social planners budget P . If the agent is baseline-optimistic, increasing e and
decreasing x in every period would increase her true expected utility by (12) and (13) respectively
and therefore also when changing behavior only in the rst period, so that @U=@e0 > 0; @U=@x0 < 0.
The increase in e0 also improves the planners budget, which can be used to increase the agents
welfare. Hence, the term A, the rst of the two terms in (14), is positive if dU^1=db1 < 0. I now
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show that dU^1=db1 < 0 if dU1=db1 = 0 for a baseline optimistic agent if in an optimal policy with
constant benets
1 + ^(~e) (~e)
1 ^(~e;~x)
u0(cu ~e) u0(ce)
u0(cu ~e)
 ^00(~e)
r^0(~e) (exp (r~x)  1) + 1

 1 ^(~e;~x)1 (~e;~x) 
0(~e)
^0(~e) . (15)
That is, at the optimal policy,
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Evaluated at the same policy,
dU^1
db1
=
@U^1
@b1
+
@U^1
@1
~ 01 (b1) = B  
^ (~e)   (~e)
 (~e)
u0(ce   r~x)

1 + "1=(~e);b

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Since B + C = 0; B < 0 if C > 0. For a baseline-optimistic agent, B < 0 implies dU^1=db1 < 0 and
thus dU1=db1 = AdU^1=db1 < 0. Now I establish when C > 0. As argued in the proof of Proposition
2, ~e0 (b) < 0 implies Q (b) > 0 and  ^00 (~e) = r^0 (~e)   1 > 0. Hence, C > 0 if condition (15) is
satised. Since the second term in the left-hand side of (15) is positive, there exists a positive upper
bound  such that (1   ^ (~e; ~x))0 (~e) = (1   (~e; ~x)) ^0 (~e)  1 +  is su¢ cient for the condition
to be satised. Hence, it is su¢ cient for the search internality to be small relative to the baseline
bias.
Appendix B: Empirical Analysis and Calibration
Price et al. (1998) organized a survey to study the prevention of depression in couples facing job loss.
The study was conducted in and around two major urban areas in Michigan and Maryland from
1996 to 1998. All participants were recruited through state unemployment o¢ ces. Initial screening
retained 1; 487 job seekers, who were part of a couple. All retained subjects were unemployed for less
than 15 weeks and looking for work, but did not expect to be recalled to their former job. About
one month after the initial screening, the retained subjects and their partners were interviewed
for the rst time. Two follow-up interviews were organized about six months and twelve months
later. A third follow-up interview was organized one month after the rst interview, but only for
a subsample of the initial group. In Table B.1, I show sample averages of the demographics of the
retained job seekers. On average, the subjects have been unemployed for 6:9 weeks at the time of
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the rst interview.
B.1 Baseline Beliefs: Actual and Expected Duration
Figure B.1: Empirical cumulative distribution: actual
duration vs. expected duration of remaining unemployment
spell
The subjects are asked about their baseline expectations in the question: How many weeks do
you estimate it will actually be before you will be working more than 20 hours a week?I interpret
the subjects answers as the number of weeks they expect to remain unemployed. In follow-up
interviews, subjects are asked when they actually started working. 86% of the subjects found work
for more than 20 hours a week before the last interview, about one year after the rst interview.
I compute the minimum duration of an unemployment spell, assuming that the other 14% of the
subjects found work on the date of the last interview. The average minimum duration equals 23:0
weeks, again starting from the rst interview.25 The distribution of the di¤erences between the
actual and expected number of weeks of unemployment is shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction.
The di¤erence between the minimum actual duration and the expected duration is shown in dark
grey for the job seekers who have not found work before the last interview. The optimistic bias
in baseline beliefs also appears clearly in Figure B.1, comparing the empirical distributions of
the expected and actual unemployment durations. The cumulative distribution of the expected
25The average optimistic bias for the sample of job seekers for whom the expectations and the actual duration are
known (n = 1; 088) equals 15:3 weeks. This excludes subjects who report to works less than 20 hours at the start
of the new job (n = 117) subjects. Including these subjects with the date they started this part-time job decreases
average optimism by less than a week. This also excludes subjects who report they have found a di¤erent job before
the one they are currenly working on, but for which no start date is known (n = 89). Including these subjects with
the date they started their current job increases average optimism by 1:5 weeks. Including these subjects assuming
they immediately found a job decreases average optimism by 1:5 weeks.
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duration stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution of the minimum duration.26 For any
number of weeks, the number of job seekers who expect their unemployment spell will end within
that time span exceeds the number of job seekers for whom the unemployment spell actually ends
within that time span.
In the web-appendix to this paper I discuss how selection e¤ects and alternative interpretations
of the survey question are unlikely to explain this extreme optimistic bias. I also provide preliminary
evidence suggesting that the bias survives during the unemployment spell.
B.2 Control Beliefs: Relation between E¤ort and Duration
Subjects are also asked how frequently they have searched for work during the month before the
interview. The questions ask about reading the newspaper for job opportunities, checking with
employment agencies, checking with friends, sending out resumes, etc. I aggregate the answers to
these questions, giving each answer the same weight, and I estimate the impact of this search index
on the actual and expected duration of unemployment.27 ;28 The regressions of interest are
actual durationi = 1 searchi +Xi1 + "i, (16a)
expected durationi = 2 searchi +Xi2 + i, (16b)
act: durationi - exp: durationi = (1   2) searchi +Xi (1   2) + "i   vi (16c)
with the durations starting from the rst interview.
Table B.2 reports the ordinary least squares estimates for these three regressions. Unemploy-
ment spells are actually shorter for unemployed workers who report to search more intensively and
they also expect their spells to be shorter. The rst e¤ect is stronger than the second e¤ect. If the
search index increases by one unit, which corresponds to doubling the frequency in every search
dimension, the actual unemployment spell is 3:4 weeks shorter, but the expected unemployment
spell is only 2:0 weeks shorter. Higher search levels correspond to lower optimism about the dura-
tion of unemployment. While the coe¢ cients of search are signicant at the 1% level in regressions
(16a) and (16b), the estimate of the di¤erence in regression (16c) is only signicant at the 10% level
(p -value = :08). If both e¤ects were causal, the estimated average control bias would be  67%.
This is much less pronounced and signicant than the baseline bias. Unobserved heterogeneity
26The kink in the cumulative distribution of the actual duration is due to the fact that I include the minimum
duration for the job seekers with incomplete spells. These minimum durations are bunched around 52 weeks, which
is the average time between the rst and the last interview.
27The correlation between this search index and any of its nine components varies between 0:48 and 0:70. The
partner of each subject is asked the exact same questions about the subjects e¤orts. The correlation between the
search index as reported by the job seekers and their partners is 0:57.
28The nine questions are: During the past month, how often have you; read the newspaper and other publications
for job opportunities? checked with employment agencies? talked to friends, family, or other people you know to get
information about jobs? used, or sent out a resume? lled out application forms for a job? telephoned, written or
visited potential employers? done things to improve the impression you would make in a job interview? contacted
a public employment service? went out on information interviews?The answer options are; 1. Not at all, 2. Once
every 3 to 4 weeks, 3. Once every couple of weeks, 4. Every week, 5. Two or three times a week, 6. Every day.
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a¤ecting both the bias in beliefs and the search e¤orts or the reverse impact of beliefs on search
e¤ort would bias the estimate of the control bias. The estimates are similar when using candidate
instrumental variables, including alternative measures of search, controlling for the willingness to
work or accounting for censoring and truncation issues, as discussed in an earlier version of this
paper (see Spinnewijn 2008).
B.3 Calibration of the Dynamic Model of the Unemployment Spell
The unit of time for the calibration is one month. The monthly discount factor equals  = 0:9956,
which corresponds to a yearly discount factor equal to 0:95. I assume that the monthly output
equals 1 when employed and 0 when unemployed. Given this rescaling, the CARA coe¢ cient is set
equal to  = 2.
Probability of Finding Work. I assume that e¤ort e is linear in the number of times a job
seeker reports to have engaged in any of the search activities as discussed in the previous section.
I rescale this e¤ort variable such that e = 0 corresponds to not having searched in any dimension
during the entire month and e = 1 corresponds to having searched every day in every dimension,
averaged over the entire month. In this interpretation, e = 0:15 corresponds to the sample average
of search e¤ort (i.e. search in all dimensions between once every couple of weeks and every
week). For these three values of search e¤ort, the probability function  (e) = 0 +1 e0:662 with
0 = 0:140 and 1 = 0:170 approximates the average duration of unemployment, estimated using
ordinary least squares (Table B.2). I assume that the perceived monthly probability of nding work
as a function of e¤ort equals ^ (e) = ^0 + ^1  e0:662 and show how the optimal policy changes for
di¤erent values of ^0 and ^1 respectively.
Monetary Cost of E¤ort. I nally calibrate the monetary cost of search function  u (e) =
 0e
 1 ,assuming that the monetary cost of e¤ort when employed equals the monetary cost of search-
ing daily in every dimension  e =  (1) =  0. I set  0 = 0:483 and  1 = 2:65 in order to match
the empirical exit rate and unemployment duration elasticity. In the US, unemployed workers are
eligible for unemployment benets for six months. The mean and median replacement rate for
which the unemployed workers are eligible equal respectively 0:43 and 0:48. When implementing
a contract that pays b = 0:45 in the rst six months and b = 0 afterwards, the calibrated model
predicts an average monthly probability of nding work equal to 0:19. This equals the average
monthly exit rate in the sample. Moreover, the predicted elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to a constant benet level b = 0:45 equals  :5. This corresponds to the empirical estimates
reviewed in Krueger and Meyer (2002). For the calibration of the cost function, I set the belief
parameters equal to ^0 = 0:361 and ^1 = 0:056, which implies an optimistic relative baseline bias
[^ (e)   (e)] = (e) equal to 100% (at the average e¤ort level e = 0:15), which is more modest
than the average baseline bias in the sample of about 200%, and a pessimistic relative control bias
^0 (e)  0 (e) =0 (e) equal to  67%, which corresponds to the relative ratio of the least squares
estimates of the actual and perceived impact of search (Table B.2).
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Table B.1
Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean StDev Obs. Mean StDev
Male 1,339 .55 .50 Partners education 1,137 13.50 2.20
Age 1,339 38.48 9.96 Monthly wage2 1,320 2.60 1.72
White 1,339 .67 .47 Times unemployed 1,339 .34 .47
Married 1,339 .81 .39 Weeks displaced3 1,339 6.91 4.16
Children 1,339 1.30 1.25 Search (at 1st int.) 1,249 3.34 .87
Education1 1,334 13.63 2.14 Search (at 3rd int.) 1,249 3.35 .95
Maryland 1,339 .45 .50 Actual duration4 1,223 23.04 21.03
Partner empl. 1,139 .79 .41 Expected duration 1,182 6.83 8.60
1 Expressed in number of years. 2 Earned on the last job before unemployment, expressed in 1000 USD. 3 Since the
start of the current unemployment spell. 4 Includes censored spells with the duration between the
rst and last interview.
Table B.2
OLS Estimates of the E¤ect of Search and Covariates on the Actual Duration of Unemployment (1), the
Expected Duration of Unemployment (2) and the Di¤erence Between the Actual and the Expected
Duration of Unemployment (3)
Actual duration Expected duration Optimism
(1) (2) (3)
Search -3.30 [757] -2.03 [.369] -1.36 [.780]
Male -3.45 [1.34] -1.88 [.457] -1.58 [1.39]
Age .201 [.073] .048 [.021] .153 [.072]
White -5.82 [1.50] -.544 [.596] -5.28 [1.54]
Married -5.07 [1.89] .306 [.576] -5.37 [1.89]
Children .783 [.528] .410 [.274] .373 [.544]
Education -.343 [.368] .317 [.126] -.659 [.362]
Maryland -2.97 [1.35] .124 [.493] -3.09 [1.34]
Partner employed -2.78 [1.62] .242 [.501] -3.02 [1.64]
Partner education .014 [.337] .205 [.115] -.192 [.333]
Monthly wage before unemp. -.732 [.392] .490 [.194] -1.21 [.369]
Times unemployed -1.22 [1.35] -.294 [.453] -.925 [1.32]
Weeks since displacement .428 [.165] .134 [.064] .294 [.163]
Obs. 1,007 1,007 1,007
R2 .087 .115 .078
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes statistical signicance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.
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Appendix C: Calibration Figures
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Figure C.1: Optimal Constant Policy without Savings for Biased Baseline Beliefs
The left panel shows the unemployment subsidy net of the cost di¤erential b+    for di¤erent values
of the baseline bias when changing ^0. The right panel shows the monthly job nding probability (e). The
values for the competitive equilibrium with private insurers are given by the dashed lines for comparison.
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Figure C.2: Optimal Constant Policy without Savings for Biased Control Beliefs
The left panel shows the unemployment subsidy net of the cost di¤erential b+    for di¤erent values
of the control bias when changing ^1. The right panel shows the monthly job nding probability (e). The
values for the competitive equilibrium with private insurers are given by the dashed lines for comparison.
31
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 10-3
baseline bias
dy
na
m
ic
 w
ed
ge
 r*
x 
 (f
ul
l)
st
at
ic
 w
ed
ge
 w
 -
t 
- b
 +
D
y
 (d
as
h)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
baseline bias
de
pl
et
io
n 
x 
(fu
ll)
ne
t s
ub
si
dy
 b
 +
t 
- D
y
 (d
as
h)
unobservable savings
controlled savings
Figure C.3: Optimal Constant Policy with Savings for Biased Baseline Beliefs
The left panel shows the dynamic wedge rx (full line) and the static wedge w      b+  (dashed line)
implied by the optimal constant policy for di¤erent values of the baseline bias when changing ^0. The right
panel shows the underlying unemployment subsidy    b+  (dashed line) and depletion level x (full
line). In the right panel, values are also shown for the optimal policy with controlled savings for comparison.
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Figure C.4: Welfare Comparison of Unemployment Policies for Biased Baseline Beliefs
The gure shows the compensating variation that make an unemployed job seeker without the policy as well
of as with the policy for four unemployment policies. The compensating variation is expressed as the present
value of a constant consumption ow. The four policies are the optimal unemployment policy without access
to savings, with unobservable savings, with controlled savings and the policy provided by private insurers in
a competitive equilibrium.
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7 Web Appendix to "Unemployed but Optimistic: Optimal In-
surance Design with Biased Beliefs"
This web appendix provides two pieces of complementary analysis. First, I discuss the robustness of
the optimistic bias presented in the introduction and appendix of the paper. Second, I characterize
the competitive equilibrium with prot-maximizing insurers discussed in Section 3.3.
7.1 Optimistic Bias
In this section I discuss how selection e¤ects and alternative interpretations of the survey question
are unlikely to explain the bias in expectations. I also provide preliminary evidence suggesting that
the optimistic bias survives during the unemployment spell.
Selection E¤ects Selection e¤ects seem to play a minor role in explaining the optimistic bias for
the sample considered in Price et al. (1998). First, the average unemployment duration decreases
in the US between 1996 and 1998, as did the average unemployment rates in four out of the
ve counties considered in the sample. It seems unlikely that job seekers were surprised by an
unexpected deterioration of economic conditions. Second, by screening through state unemployment
o¢ ces, only job seekers who are ling for unemployment benets are selected. These job seekers
are the most policy relevant group of unemployed workers. Moreover, this selection e¤ect does not
necessarily increase the estimate of baseline optimism either. Anderson and Meyer (1997) document
that the main reason why displaced workers do not take up unemployment benets is that they
expect that the unemployment spell will be short.29 Third, the sample characteristics are similar
to the characteristics of the unemployed in Maryland and Michigan between 1996 and 1998 in the
Current Population Survey.30 Fourth, the job seekers in this sample have been unemployed for 7
weeks on average at the time of the rst interview. This implies that both job seekers with ex
post short unemployment spells and baseline-pessimistic job seekers, who search more intensively,
are likely to be underrepresented in the sample. However, the average baseline-optimistic bias is
hardly smaller for the newly unemployed. For the 249 job seekers who have been unemployed for
3 weeks or less, the average optimistic bias equals 14:5 weeks. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test does
not reject that the baseline bias has the same distribution for the recently displaced job seekers
and the other job seekers (p-value = :79). Fifth, exit rates tend to decrease with the duration of
unemployment, which may explain why the average remaining duration in the sample considered
here is high. The average duration of unemployment for newly unemployed is about 14 weeks in
29Anderson and Meyer (1997) nd that 37 percent of the job losers and leavers eligible for UI give Expected to
get another job soon/be recalledas the reason for not applying for UI, whereas no other single reason is given by
more than 7 percent of them.
30Out of the 425 unemployed in Maryland and Michigan in the March CPS between 1996 and 1998, 54 percent are
male and 69 percent are white, compared to 53 percent and 73 percent respectively in the sample considered in this
paper. The unemployed in the CPS sample have less education and are younger. This may be explained by the fact
that this sample is restricted to couples. Compared with the married unemployed in the CPS, the distributions of
education and age are more similar. Notice that baseline optimism is signicantly higher for the less educated and
not signicantly lower for the young job seekers.
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Figure 2: Histogram of the reported expectations with bins labeled by the percentiles of the actual duration
the US in 1996 (Valletta 1998). This is still twice as long as the average expectation in the sample.
Finally, the US economy was expanding during the period that the survey was organized, which may
a¤ect the baseline bias. When a crisis hits, the average unemployment duration increases. With
unemployment at the centre of attention during the crisis, expectations may adjust even more such
that the optimistic bias would be smaller or even reversed. However, Mueller and Spinnewijn (in
progress) nd an optimistic baseline bias that is as extreme in magnitude based on a survey of job
seekers in New Jersey, conducted during the Great Recession.
Reported Expectations One may be concerned about the extent to which the duration pre-
dictions capture the job seekers expectations on which they act. First, the job seekers are not
explicitly incentivized to report their expectations truthfully. I do not observe actual behavior
either, like their savings for instance, to verify to what extent their behavior is explained by the
reported expectations. The expectations do however explain half as much variation in the actual
duration of the unemployment spells as all other demographic and employment variables together.31
Also, the growing literature on the measurement of expectations conrms the predictive value of
surveyed expectations for both actual outcomes and future behavior (Manski 2004). Second, I
interpret the job seekersreported point predictions as their subjective means. However, some job
seekers may report di¤erent distributional features as their point predictions, like the median or
any other percentile.32 The Figure suggests that it is unlikely that these alternative interpretations
of the question play an important role in explaining the optimistic bias. It shows the distribution
of the reported expectations by the percentiles of the actual duration distribution. That is, for
each job seeker it shows the percentile he or she should have had in mind if his or her reported
point prediction were to be accurate ex post. This assumes that the population distribution is the
31The R2 for the rst regression in Table B.2, which regresses the actual duration on all considered covariates,
increases from :087 to :128 when including the expected duration as an explanatory variable. The R2 for regressing
the actual duration on only the expected duration equals :052.
32Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) argue that the elicitation of probabilistic forecasts is therefore more
instructive. Notice hovever that the use of these point predictions about the duration of unemployment does avoid
bunching issues that arise when eliciting probabilities.
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true distribution that all job seekers are facing. The point predictions are centered around the
20th percentile of the actual duration distribution, and more than 90% of the predictions are below
the median (and thus below the mean). Finally, an alternative question in the survey asking for
a probabilistic forecast suggests similar optimism about the baseline probability of nding work,
although it does not allow quantifying the bias.
Changes in Beliefs In the dynamic model of the unemployment spell in Section 4, I have made
the simplifying assumption that the perceived probability of nding work is not a¤ected by the
duration of unemployment. This contradicts learning by unemployed workers. However, the beliefs
reported by the job seekers suggest that not much learning is going on.
First, the number of times a job seeker has been unemployed in the last three years does not
signicantly lower his or her optimism about the current unemployment spell (p -value = :48), as
shown in Table B.2 in the appendix to the paper. Second, the number of weeks a job seeker has
been unemployed in the current spell even tends to increase the optimistic bias (p -value = :07).
Both results are cross-sectional and do not necessarily rule out that the optimistic baseline bias
decreases when job seekers become more experienced. Job seekers who are less optimistic about
nding a job may search more and leave unemployment earlier. However, su¢ cient learning would
overcome this selection e¤ect. Finally, unsuccessful job seekers hardly increase their expectations
during unemployment. I nd that the distribution of expectations held by job seekers about the
remaining number of weeks of unemployment is very stable throughout the unemployment spell.
The average of the expectations at the rst interview is not signicantly di¤erent from the average
of the expectations one month or six months later, comparing the same sample of job seekers. Only
the job seekers who are still unemployed at the time of the last interview, about twelve months
after the rst interview, report expectations that are signicantly higher than at the rst interview.
Together these results suggest that if some learning about the bias is going on, it is very modest.33
7.2 Competitive Equilibrium with Prot-Maximizing Insurers
The analysis highlights the potential importance of the agents decision to protect herself against
unemployment for the design of social insurance. In the context of unemployment insurance, the
role of private insurance is limited in practice. The question whether government interventions are
needed depends in the rst place on whether the equilibrium coverage provided by private insurers
would be socially optimal. This section addresses this question by characterizing the equilibrium
contract (bp; p) o¤ered by competing private insurers in the absence of any public provision,
which is a natural benchmark for the optimal policy. A well-known result in public economics
is that moral hazard, in contrast with adverse selection, does not raise the need for government
33Notice that if job seekers are uncertain about their ability to nd a job at the start, a longer unemployment
spell should make them revise their beliefs about the remaining duration upward. The data suggests that they are
revising their beliefs upward, at least after twelve months, however they may not revise su¢ ciently and become more
optimistic compared to an unbiased job seeker who is Bayesian updating, the longer they are unemployed. This is
what Falk, Hu¤man and Sunde (2006) nd in a laboratory experiment.
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intervention per se (e.g., Chetty and Saez 2010). Competing private insurers would o¤er the socially
optimal insurance contract. This is no longer true when the agents beliefs are biased. In order
to attract agents, private insurers o¤er contracts that maximize the agentsperceived rather than
true expected utility. Notice that the wedge between private and social insurance is not su¢ cient
to justify government interventions. A policy maker is not necessarily paternalistic, but may care
about an agents perceived welfare as when for example he would try to gain the agents vote in
elections. If a policy maker only cares about the agents perceived welfare, he would implement the
exact same policy as the competing prot-maximizing insurers.34
With competition driving prots down to zero, the contract (bp; p) o¤ered in a competitive
equilibrium is characterized by
max
b;
u(c0) +  [^ (e)u(ce) + (1  ^ (e))u(cu)  e)] (17)
subject to ICe; ICs and the balanced budget constraint
 +
1
1 + r
[ (e)    (1   (e)) b] = 0. (BC)
The single di¤erence with the social planners problem is that the uncertain outcomes of the agents
search e¤ort are weighted with the perceived probabilities ^ (e) and 1   ^ (e) to calculate the
perceived expected utility. In equilibrium, a budget-balanced increase in the benet level bp and
tax level p has no rst-order impact on the agents perceived expected utility,
dU^
db
= 0 , @U^
@b
+
@U^
@
~ 0 (bp) = 0. (18)
The equilibrium condition (18) reveals two di¤erences with the social optimum. First, the rate
at which the tax p needs to be increased when increasing the benet bp is exactly the same
as before and depends on the true probabilities. However, the perceived value of this budget-
balanced increase depends on the perceived probabilities. For example, baseline-optimistic agents
underestimate the insurance value relative to its cost. This induces private insurers to lower the
unemployment benet relative to the social planner. Second, the behavioral responses to a policy
change have only a second-order impact on the agents perceived expected utility. In contrast with
the social planner, private insurers do not try to correct the agents distorted e¤ort and savings
choice. For example, in the case of control-optimistic agents who exert too much e¤ort given the
true returns, this would again induce private insurers to reduce the unemployment benet relative to
the social planner. The following Proposition characterizes the competitive equilibrium in absence
of social insurance.
34See Salanié and Treich (2009) for an analysis comparing policies by a paternalistic and populist policy maker.
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Proposition 5 The equilibrium contract o¤ered by prot-maximizing insurers is characterized by
1 ^(~e)
1 (~e)u
0(cu)  1+^(~e)1+(~e) u^0 (ce)
1+^(~e)
1+(~e) u^
0 (ce)
= "1 (~e);b, (19)
for u^0 (ce)  u
0(c0)+^(~e)u0(ce)
1+^(~e) and  (1 + r) = 1.
Proof. The competitive equilibrium solves
max
b
u(w   ~ (b)  ~s (b))+
 [^ (~e (b))u(w   ~ (b) + (1 + r) ~s (b)) + (1 ^ (~e (b)))u(b+ (1 + r) ~s (b))  ~e (b)] ,
where ~ (b) ; ~s (b) and ~e (b) are implicitly dened by ICe; ICs and BC. The rst-order condition of
the maximization equals
dU^
db
= 0, @U^
@b
+
@U^
@
~ 0 (b) = 0, with
@U^
@b
=  (1  ^ (~e))u0(cu), @U^
@
=  u0(c0)  ^ (~e)u0 (ce)    (1 + ^ (~e)) u^0 (ce) and
~ 0 (b) =
1
1+r (1   (~e))
1 + 11+r (~e)

1 + "1 (~e);b

.
The rst-order impact of e¤ort and savings responses on the perceived expected utility equals zero
by ICe and ICs, i.e., @U^=@e = @U^=@s = 0. Using the above expressions and  (1 + r) = 1, I can
rewrite the FOC as
dU^
db
= (1   (~e)) = 1  ^ (~e)
1   (~e)u
0(cu)  1 + ^ (~e)
1 +  (~e)
u^0 (ce)

1 + "1 (~e);b

= 0,
1 ^(~e)
1 (~e)u
0(cu)  1+^(~e)1+(~e) u^0 (ce)
1+^(~e)
1+(~e) u^
0 (ce)
= "1 (~e);b.
The adjusted Baily formula (19) for the competitive equilibrium immediately follows.
A comparison of Proposition 1 here and Proposition 1 in the main text conrms that biases in
baseline beliefs and control beliefs drive a wedge between the social optimum and the competitive
equilibrium. Interestingly, competition forces private insurers to charge the actuarially fair price
for insurance and thus subjects them to the same budget constraint as the social planner, but it
does not force them to sell the optimal amount of insurance.35 In particular, when agents are too
optimistic about the risk of unemployment, providing insurance becomes unprotable for private
35DellaVigna (2009) discusses similar ndings when agents have irrational expectations about their self-control
problems or inattention. For instance, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) nd that competing rms will distort the
consumption of naive individuals with self-control problems, pricing investment goods below and leisure goods above
marginal cost. Still, competition will drive down the xed contract fee.
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insurers. As discussed in the main text, this suggests a natural explanation for the puzzle of why
unemployment insurance is mostly publicly provided.36,37 In fact, if possible, private insurers would
undo the undervalued social insurance by buying unemployment insurance from the agent. In order
to increase the insurance coverage, the social planner would have to intervene by subsidizing private
insurance provision or regulating the private market.
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